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ETHICS PROGRAM
Shrinking Pool of Energy Lawyers and Consequent Unauthorized Practice Problems.
Industry restructuring to foster competition will produce new market entrants looking for
competent lawyers in a discrete, sophisticated area of practice. New market entrants in a
jurisdiction may discover that lawyers qualified by expertise and experience are not available
there because they represent industry competitors whose interests are directly adverse.
The shrinking pool of energy lawyers presents a serious dilemma for new market entrants. Do
they hire just any lawyer and await the learning curve required for effective representation? Or
do they turn to their home-situs lawyer who is not admitted to practice in the jurisdiction in
which they wish to do business and to appear before regulatory agencies.
The unauthorized practice of law problem is tied to Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct
(hereinafter "VRPC") 5.5:
 
A lawyer shall not:
practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation the legal profession in
that jurisdiction; or
assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.[1]
A crucial question for lawyers is at what point does a lawyer's contact with a foreign jurisdiction
become the practice of law in that jurisdiction. An alarming answer to the question was given in
Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court.[2] Two lawyers from the New York
law firm must meet in California with their California client on numerous occasions to discuss its
dispute with another California bar. The lawyers gave advice and discussed a proposed
settlement in California. They also conducted negotiations of a settlement and began arbitration
proceedings in California before the matter settled. Later the client sued the law firm for
malpractice, and the law firm counterclaimed for its fee.
The Birbrower court held that the law firm's fee agreement was not enforceable in California for services
performed in California because the law firm's activities in California constituted the unauthorized practice of
law. Significantly, the court stated that a foreign lawyer could violate the unauthorized practice of law
prohibition without being physically present in California by advising a California law regarding a California
dispute by telephone, fax, or electronic mail.[3]
 
There are few decisions that address the question of permissible practice in foreign jurisdictions.
Those that exist suggest that Birbrower is over broad. [4] The following rule is stated in the
Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers:
A lawyer currently admitted to practice in a jurisdiction may provide legal services to a client:
* * *
(3) at a place within a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not admitted to the extent the lawyer's activities in
the matter arise out of or are otherwise reasonably related to the lawyer's practice [in the admitting
jurisdiction].[5]
The comment to § 3 contains the following observations about permitting practice in a foreign jurisdiction:
When other activities of a lawyer in a non-home state are challenged as impermissible for lack of
local admission, the context in which and purposes for which the lawyer acts should be carefully
assessed. Beyond home state activities, proper representation of clients often requires a
transactional lawyer to conduct activities while physically present in one or more other states.
Such practice is customary in many areas of legal representation. As stated in Subsection (3),
such activities should be recognized as permissible so long as they arise out of or otherwise
reasonably relate to the lawyer's practice in a state of admission. In determining that issue,
several factors are relevant, including the following: whether the lawyer's client is a regular
client of the lawyer or, if a new client, is from the lawyer's home state, has extensive contacts
with that state, or contacted the lawyer there; whether a multi-state transaction has other
significant connections with the lawyer's home state; whether significant aspects of the lawyer's
activities are conducted in the lawyer's home state; whether a significant aspect of the matter
involves the law of the lawyer's home state; and whether either the activities of the client involve
multiple jurisdictions or the legal issues involved are primarily either multistate or federal in
nature. Because lawyers in a firm often practice collectively, the activities of all lawyers in the
representation of a client are relevant. The customary practices of lawyers who engage in
interstate law practice is one appropriate measure of the reasonableness of a lawyer's activities
out of state....[6]
I. Client Engagement/Retainer Agreements.
A. Lawyers will be well advised to craft client engagement/retainer agreements that define the
content of the attorney-client relationship.
B. A critical element of a client engagement/retainer agreement consists of a statement of the fee
to be charged for the representation. VRPC 1.5(b) requires an adequate disclosure to the client of
the lawyer's fee and states that, when the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the
amount, basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, "preferably in writing,"
before or within a reasonable time after beginning the representation.[7] VRPC 1.5(c) requires
contingent fee agreements to be in writing.[8]
C. Whatever the fee arrangement, VRPC 1.5(a) requires that a lawyer's fee shall be reasonable
and sets forth eight factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee.[9] That a
fee is stated and agreed to in a contract does not mean that it is reasonable since contracts for
legal services are not treated as ordinary commercial contracts.[10] For example, the court in
McKenzie Const. Co. v. Maynard, set aside a 33% contingent fee agreement where the recovery
was $195,000 and billing at the regular hourly rate would have produced a fee of $4,000.[11]
D. An observation from a quieter, gentler era: "In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the
profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money getting trade."[12]
E. Since litigation of a fee dispute is rather unseemly (and often results in a counterclaim for
malpractice), some client engagement/retainer agreements include a provision requiring
arbitration. VA Legal Ethics Op. 1707 (1998) concluded that an arbitration provision is ethically
permissible under VA Disciplinary Rule 5-104(A) (superseded by VRPC 1.7(b)) if -
1. Before entering into the engagement agreement, the lawyer makes a full and
adequate disclosure to the client of all possible consequences of the building
arbitration provision,
2. The client gives an informed consent, and
3. The binding arbitration provision is not unconscionable, unfair, or inequitable,
when made.[13]
II. Government Lawyers entering Private Practice
A. It is not uncommon for a lawyer to be employed by a regulatory agency, to gain significant
knowledge and expertise, and then to leave the agency and join a law firm that represents clients
before or adverse to the agency.
B. VRPC 1.11(b) addresses the ethical constraints on successive government and private
employment as follows:
Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private
client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the private client and the
appropriate government agency consent after consultation. No lawyer in a firm with
which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation
in such a matter unless:
the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to enable it to
ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.[14]
C. VA Legal Ethics Op. 1699 (1997), applying the equivalent prohibition in DR 9-101(B),
concluded that a former Assistant City Attorney who entered private practice was not permitted
to represent a client seeking to have a zoning ordinance declared invalid when she had
participated in drafting it during her employment as Assistant City Attorney. But see, VA Legal
Ethics Op. 1299 (1990) (former government agency permitted to represent client challenging
agency regulation where the regulation promulgated was materially different from lawyer's
initial draft).[15]
D. The screen (or the so-called Chinese Wall) that VRPC 1.11(b)(1) recognizes is a significant
addition. DR 9-101(B) did not recognize a screen and resulted in vicarious disqualification of all
lawyers in the firm. The screening mechanism, it is suggested, is a blow to the realities of
practice in law firms.
III. Who is the Client?
A. One result of industry deregulation has been the formation of various alliances, associations,
and consortiums among industry members to advocate matters of common interest before the
regulatory agencies. In some instances the members have a common interest in some matters but
differing interests in other matters.
B. A lawyer representing an alliance, association, or consortium of companies has an attorney-
client relationship with the organization but not with the members individually simply because
the lawyer represents the organization.[16] VPRC 1.13(d) cautions, however, that in dealing with
the constituents of an organization, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is
apparent the organization's interest are adverse to those of the constituents.[17]
C. That a lawyer represents the organization and not its constituents may not permit the lawyer to
represent a client in litigation against a constituent. The court in Westinghouse Elect. Corp. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp. disqualified a law firm from representing the plaintiff in an antitrust action
against companies that belonged to a trade association the law firm represented.[18]
Disqualification was warranted because, in the course of the representation of the trade
association, the law firm had received confidential information from members. The law firm, it
was said, had a fiduciary duty to safeguard the confidential information received.[19]
IV. Multiple Clients in the Same Matter.
A. A lawyer representing an alliance, association, or consortium may also represent one or more
of its constituents, or without representing the alliance, association, or consortium may represent
several of the constituents in the same matter. The ethical test in each instance is whether the
clients are directly adverse, or whether the lawyer's representation of each client will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to the other client(s) in the matter.[20] If there
is direct adversity between the clients, or if the representation of one client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to the other client(s), then the multiple representation is
not ethically permissible under VRPC 1.7 unless (1) the lawyer "reasonably believes" the
multiple representation will not adversely affect the clients, and (2) the clients consent after
consultation, including an explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.[21] The loss of attorney-client privilege is one risk. The
prevailing rule is that when two clients are represented by the same lawyer in a matter, neither of
them may assert the privilege against the other in litigation between them regarding the subject
of the dual representation.[22] Moreover, once the multiple clients represented by the lawyer in a
matter develop an actual, adversarial conflict of interest, the lawyer is not permitted to continue
representation of any of the clients.[23]
B. Significantly, the "reasonably believes" standard in Rule 1.7 is defined in the terminology
portion of the Preamble to the VRPC as "the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent
lawyer," which is an objective measurement.[24] So clients' consent to adverse representation,
even in unrelated matters, is not curative of every conflict of interest. Thus, if a disinterested
lawyer would determine that a client should not agree to the representation under the
circumstances, the lawyer may not properly ask for the clients' consent to the adverse
representation.[25] Moreover, in some circumstances the client may withdraw consent once
given.[26]
C. The rules governing representation of multiple clients, whether in the same matter or in an
unrelated matter, implicate fundamental principles of the attorney-client relationship. In
representing a client, VRPC 2.1 mandates, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice.[27] Implicit in the exercise of independent professional
judgment is loyalty to the client. Loyalty is impaired whenever a lawyer will temper his
representation of one client because of his representation of another client's interest.[28]
V. Lawyer as intermediary.
A. VRPC 2.2 has no counterpart in the Disciplinary Rules. It was adopted from the
ABA Model Rules.
B. Because of the importance of VRPC 2.2 to lawyers, it is set out:
(a) Except as prohibited in paragraph (d), a lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the common representation,
including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and
obtains each client's consent to the common representation;
the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms compatible with the
clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the
matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the
contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and
the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be undertaken impartially
and without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the
decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that each client can
make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if any of the
conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not
continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation.
A lawyer shall not act as intermediary between client in certain matters relating to divorce,
annulment or separation [...].[29]
C. VRPC 2.2 contemplates that the lawyer's clients have some sophistication or business
expertise about the matter and, upon the lawyer's advocacy-free, impartial presentation of factors
relevant to a decision, the clients will be able to make adequately informed decisions. The lawyer
represents the clients who have potentially conflicting interests, but the lawyer's charge is to
develop their mutual interests in the matter.[30]
D. The common representation of clients in intermediation is not permissible when the clients
have already articulated a contentious, antagonistic assertion and denial of rights. In that
circumstance the lawyer cannot be impartial between the contending clients. The distinction
between VRPC 1.7 and VRPC 2.2 should not be overlooked. Under VRPC 1.7 the lawyer
examines whether he can provide independent professional judgment to and simultaneously
serve the interests of clients in the matter.[31] Under VRPC 2.2 the lawyer acts impartially
between the clients to facilitate their decision in the matter following the lawyer's informed but
neutral presentation of relevant considerations.[32]
VI. Corporate Affiliates.
A. The "who is the client" question is reprised in the corporate family context. Is a law firm
permitted to take on a representation adverse to a subsidiary, sister corporation, or affiliate of a
current corporate client? Courts and ethics panels addressing the question are divided.
B. In ABA Formal Opinion 95-390, dated January 25, 1995, the ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility sought to define the situations in which a lawyer may, or
may not, accept a representation that is adverse to an affiliate (e.g., a parent subsidiary, or sister
corporation) of a corporate client.[33] Four of the committee's members favored a per se test that
would automatically preclude a lawyer from taking a representation directly adverse to a
corporate affiliate of a client. Six of the committee's members adopted a "qualitative" test that
implicates several factors: (1) has the lawyer acquired confidential information from the affiliate
of the corporate client, (2) do the corporate client and the affiliate share from a common legal
department that supervises and manages litigation for both, (3) is the affiliate an alter ego of the
corporate client, (4) is the subject of the lawyer's representation adverse to the affiliate
substantially related to the representation of the corporate client, (5) will the corporate client's
personnel with whom the lawyer deals be involved in the matter adverse to the affiliate, (6) has
the affiliate ever been a client of the lawyer, (7) will the lawyer's representation adverse to the
affiliate have a materially adverse effect on the corporate client, and (8) has the law firm erected
a Chinese Wall between the lawyer representing the corporate client and the lawyers representing
a client adverse to the corporate affiliate.[34]
C. The corporate affiliate issue will continue to be a significant one for lawyers because of the
marketplace. There has been a proliferation of subsidiaries and affiliates of multi-national
corporations. Sprint Corporation, for example, has more than 250 subsidiaries and affiliates.
Moreover, the number of large law firms with multiple offices has grown. Bowing to those
realities, Judge Anderson suggested in Reuben H. Donnelly Corp. v. Sprint Pub. & Advertising,
Inc. that if Sprint wished to shield its 250 subsidiaries from adverse representation by Sprint's
law firms, Sprint could include in its engagement agreements a provision barring representation
adverse to any of its subsidiaries and affiliates and then regularly provide its law firms with
updated lists of affiliates.[35] The suggestion comports with common sense since the corporate
client has superior knowledge about the corporate affiliates it has and what the relationship is
between those affiliates and itself.
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